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GAO REPORT CONFIRMS FAILURE
OF U.S. GUIDELINES
Michael Tonry*

Like the dog that didn't bark in Conan Doyle's
"Silver Blaze", thereby giving Sherlock Holmes the
crucial clue, the U.S. Sentencing Commission's selfevaluation is most noteworthy for the questions it
does not ask and the answers it does not provide.
The available answers to the Commission's unasked
questions make it clear that the guidelines have
failed-that they remain deeply unpopular and mired
in controversy, that they have made case processing
more expensive and time-consuming, and that they
have not demonstrably reduced disparities.
The silences in the Commission's report became
clear when the General Accounting Office released
its assessment of the guidelines' first four years. Here
are three examples. First, the Commission never
point-blank asked judges and other practitioners
whether the current guidelines system is better than
the federal sentencing system that preceded it. GAO
did ask such questions, and concluded, "prosecutors
generally believed that the guidelines improved the
sentencing system, while most judges, defense
attorneys, and probation officers on balance did not
believe the guidelines were an improvement over the
prior system."'
Second, the Commission report does not examine
whether the guidelines increased case processing
times and costs. GAO, by contrast, reports that "the
guidelines increased system workload" and that
median case processing time from indictment to
conviction increased by 29 percent (from 3.2 to 4.5
months), and that median time from conviction to
sentencing increased by 41 percent (from 41 to 69
days).2 Along similar lines, the Commission's 1991
annual report 3 shows that trial rates, after holding
steady around 11 percent of dispositions from 1988
to 1990, jumped by a third to 14.4% in 1991.
Third, although the Commission claims its data
"show significant reductions in disparity," 4 the body
of the report discusses disparity analyses only for
eight narrowly defined crimes, for only three of
which statistically significant conclusions were
reached. GAO unambiguously concluded that it is
"impossible to determine how effective the sentencbeen in reducing overall sentencing guidelines have
5
ing disparity."
The Commission's silence concerning whether
judges and others believe the guidelines are an
improvement over what preceded them and whether
the federal courts' handling of criminal cases became
more or less efficient under guidelines, and its
exaggerated conclusions about disparities, are
Sonosky Professor of Law and Public Policy, University
of Minnesota.
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striking. Those are the key questions which most
observers want answered and are the bases on which
the guidelines have most often been challenged.
In order to help readers reach their own conclusions, this article describes the inquiries undertaken
by the Commission and GAO, methodological
problems that confronted those inquiries, and
conclusions reached. Not all of the subjects investigated by the Commission and GAO are considered.
For example, both the Commission and GAO concluded that average sentences expected to be served
nearly doubled across the board between 1984 and
1990 and that probation-only sentences became much
less common, but I say no more in this article on
those subjects. In the interest of a manageably narrowed focus, Parts I-Il review the Commission and
GAO evaluations on the three issues mentioned
above-overall judgments of the guidelines, case
processing efficiencies, and sentencing disparitiesand Part IV looks at the Commission's (and others')
assessments of the guidelines' effects on plea bargaining and hypothesized shifts of discretion from judges
to prosecutors. For sharper focus, each section
begins by presenting critics' and GAO's views of the
guidelines and then describes the Commission's
inquiries and considers whether the Commission's
self-evaluation refutes or confirms the criticisms.
Two subjects need to be addressed before looking
at particular findings. First, as was also conspicuously evident in the Commission's 1991 report on
mandatory penalties, the work by the Commission's
staff on the self-evaluation is sophisticated and
careful. Methodological and analytical problems are
acknowledged. In the report's technical sections,
conclusions are carefully qualified and there is little if
any overclaiming. Such overclaiming as exists is in
introductory and concluding sections in which Commission members presumably played much larger
roles than they are likely to have played in drafting
and revising technical discussions. For example, in
introductory and concluding passages resistance to
the guidelines is consistently understated ("guideline
implementation is moving steadily forward . . . with
clear indications of increasing acceptance and
success")6 and the evidence on reduction in disparities is overstated ("the preliminary data . . .show
significant reductions in disparity").7
Second, an overview of how the Commission
evaluated the guidelines' effects may be a useful
backdrop to the discussion that follows. The Commission combined qualitative and quantitative methods. To examine sentencing patterns and disparities
over time, the Commission principally used the
Federal Probation Sentencing and Supervision
Information System (FPSSIS) of the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts, "augmented FPSSIS data"
from 10,000 cases sentenced in 1985, its own monitoring data, and data from the Federal Bureau of
Prisons. Most comparisons of sentencing before and
under guidelines compare sentences as announced
and, to take account of parole release and good time,
sentences "expected to be served." To examine
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broad aggregate patterns in case processing, the
Commission used data maintained by the Executive
Office of the U.S. Attorneys. To examine practitioners' adaptations and reactions to guidelines,
Commission staff interviewed judges, prosecutors,
defense counsel, and probation officers in 12 district
courts (one selected randomly from each circuit, plus
one large, high-volume district chosen non-randomly). Finally, to get a broad-based indication of
practitioners' opinions, the Commission conducted a
national mail survey of all federal judges and
assistant U.S. attorneys and of samples of private
defense counsel, federal defenders, and probation
officers. Hereafter, for ease of reference, these four
evaluation components are referred to respectively as
the "quantitative analysis," the "US Attorney data,"
the "12 site visits," and the "national survey."
I.

Have the Guidelines Improved
Federal Sentencing?
In 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee
reported that, among federal judges and others,
"There is a pervasive concern the Commission's
guidelines are producing fundamental and deleterious changes in the way federal courts process
criminal cases," a view apparently shared by most
judges attending the recent Second and Eighth
Circuit Sentencing Institute, and echoed by GAO in
its report on the views of practitioners interviewed in
four district courts. Does the Commission's selfevaluation refute those conclusions? No.
The Commission's self-evaluation, though it tries
to put its findings in the best possible light, reports
data consistent with GAO's. As GAO, perhaps
ironically, points out, the Commission "from its
interviews ... did not report on whether the guidelines
had improved the system for sentencing offenders. It
asked interviewees whether the guidelines had been
effective in meeting the congressionally established
purposes of sentencing." 9 Rather than risk asking,
"have the guidelines improved the federal system of
sentencing?" or something similar, the Commission
defined the Congress's primary purpose to be the
elimination of unwarranted sentencing disparity, and
was then hoist on its own petard. The national
survey found that only 32 percent of judges (415 of
745 answered), 11 percent of federal defenders, and
19 percent of private attorneys believed the guidelines had reduced unwarranted sentencing disparities, and bare majorities of assistant U.S. attorneys (51
percent) and probation officers (52 percent) believed
disparities had been reduced. Nearly as many judges
(28 percent) believed disparities had increased as
believed them to have decreased (32 percent). 10
An aside may be in order concerning reasons
why the Commission, unlike GAO, did not inquire
whether the current guidelines system is an improvement over the prior system. The Commission
implies in its report that the Congress directed it to
investigate disparities and other specified issues but
did not authorize it to consider the overall desirability of the new system. However, Section 236(a)(1) of

Chapter 1I of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act
of 1984 directs GAO to "compare the guidelines system with the operation of the prior sentencing and
parole system," and Section 236(a)(2) directs the
Commission to "submit a report ... detailing the
operation of the sentencing guidelines system and
discussing any problems . . . includ[ing] an evaluation of the impact of the sentencing guidelines on
prosecutorial discretion, plea bargaining, disparities
in sentencing ..
" The Commission chose to
construe that broad language as limiting its evaluative focus rather than as authorizing it to undertake
broad inquiries.
The closest the Commission came to asking the
global question, "Is the current federal sentencing
system better or worse than its predecessor," was to
ask practitioners during the 12 site visits to identify
problems with the guidelines. Ninety-four percent
of judges described serious problems." Of 50 judges
interviewed, 48 percent complained that the guidelines unduly reduce judicial discretion, 42 percent
characterized the guidelines as inflexible, 38 percent
thought they overburdened the judiciary, and 32
percent thought they overburdened the prisons.
Only 3 judges (6 percent) mentioned no problems.
Federal defenders and private defense attorneys
made the same complaints, though more frequently,
as did probation officers and prosecutors, though
less frequently.
The data summarized from the Commission's
self-evaluation and from the GAO study thus are
consistent with earlier reports on practitioners'
reactions to the federal guidelines. They were
deeply unpopular when they were promulgated and
they remain deeply unpopular today.
II. Have the Guidelines Increased Case
Processing Times and Costs?
The Federal Courts Study Committee reported in
1990 that 90 percent of district judges surveyed
"stated that the guidelines made sentencing more
time-consuming. Over half reported an increase of
at least 25 percent and a third reported an increase of
over 50 percent."12 GAO, as noted earlier, agreed.
When GAO's data on median times from indictment
to conviction and from conviction to sentencing are
combined, the median time for disposition of a
federal criminal case increased by 49 percent (from
137 to 204 days). Time is money in the federal courts
as everywhere else; increasing the time required to
dispose of the average case necessarily means that
the U.S. sentencing guidelines have substantially
increased the cost of handling criminal cases in the
federal courts. Does the Commission's self-evaluation refute those conclusions? No.
The Commission's self-evaluation does not
directly discuss case processing times and costs, but
two aspects of the Commission's report indirectly
examine the subject. One section,' using the U.S.
Attorney data, looks at aggregate numbers of cases
filed and resolved, and plea and trial rates, and finds
no discernible change in prosecutorial decisions
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attributable to the guidelines. The Commission
asserted, "of particular interest is the lack of an effect
associated with the guidelines on the number and
proportion of guilty pleas among filed cases."14 The
only trouble with this last conclusion is that it is
wrong. The Commission's 1991 annual report
showed that dispositions by plea fell that year to 85.6
percent after fluctuating between 88 and 89 percent
for the three preceding years."5 Presumably this
represents a delayed effect of higher trial demands
by offenders facing especially severe penalties.
Given that the number of criminal cases in the
federal courts has increased significantly since the
mid-1980s, the logistical and financial implications of
the increase in trial rates are ominous.
The Commission has for some years been claiming that apparently stable levels of case dispositions
by plea are evidence that the guidelines have not
disrupted the work of the federal courts. There was
always reason to suspect that the data were misleading. After all, because the guidelines apply only to
offenses committed after November 1, 1987, until
very recently a large percentage of disposed cases
each year have been cases not subject to the guidelines (in fiscal 1990, for example, only 65 percent of
sentenced cases fell under the guidelines; by June
1991, that number rose to 74 percent). More importantly, however, increased trial rates were a foreseeable effect of the greatly increased severity of
sentencing under the guidelines. A defendant facing
a ten, twenty, or thirty year sentence has little reason
not to take a chance on a trial and such a defendant
not confined before trial has an obvious incentive to
defer the nearly inevitable as long as possible.
Here, too, the claims of Commission critics are
supported by GAO's findings. It is a bit odd that the
Commission's self-evaluation did not look at case
processing times, and accordingly that conclusions
must be drawn without benefit of the Commission's
own analyses. The conclusion that the guidelines
have greatly increased court costs and delays is
inescapable.
III. Have the Guidelines Reduced Unwarranted
Sentencing Disparities?
We simply do not know whether implementation
of the federal guidelines has reduced the prevalence
of unwarranted sentencing disparities in the federal
courts. GAO's conclusion, mentioned earlier, based
both on examination of the Commission's analysis
and its own reanalyses of Commission data, is that
"limitations and inconsistencies in the data available
for preguidelines and guideline offenders made it
impossible to determine how effective the sentencing
guidelines have been in reducing overall sentencing
disparity." 16 Does the Commission's self-evaluation
refute that conclusion? No.
GAO observed that "significant differences in
much of the offender data available made it difficult
to reliably match and compare groups of preguidelines and guidelines offenders. Preguideline offender data focused on personal information, such as

socioeconomic status and family and community ties,
that was supposed to be irrelevant under the guidelines in all or most cases. Conversely, most of the
detailed data available on guidelines offenders, such
as role in the offense, were not available for
preguidelines cases."17
The insurmountable problem that comparable
data are not available on sentencing disparities before
and under guidelines served as the basis for GAOs
agnosticism, though it agreed with Commission
analyses showing reduction in disparities for some
selected offenses. GAO's own analysis showed that
"unwarranted disparity continued" in relation to
8
offenders' race, gender and employment status.
The Commission provided three types of evidence on sentencing disparities. First, it reported
findings from the national survey of judges and other
federal court practitioners. Although the Commission takes solace from the finding that 32 percent of
judges believed that the guidelines decreased the
prevalence of unwarranted sentencing disparities, the
more important finding is that 56 percent of judges
believed that sentencing disparities remained the
same or worsened (12 percent expressed no opinion).
Second, based on the 12 site visits, the Commission concluded that "judges, prosecutors, and
probation officers generally agree that the guidelines
have, in some measure, achieved one of the primary
goals [reduced sentencing disparities] established by
Congress." 19 That practitioners "generally agree"
that disparities declined "in some measure" is a
highly hedged conclusion. In any case, the results of
the site-visit interviews are less reliable than those
from the national survey because much smaller
numbers of people were involved (for example, 50
judges in the site visits compared with 415 in the
national survey) and their responses are less likely to
be representative. Even the national survey, however, is likely to exaggerate support for the guidelines; judges and others who refused to complete and
return the Commission's survey are likelier to be
hostile or disenchanted with the guidelines than are
judges who cooperated.
Table 1
Percentage of Practitioners Who Believe
Unwarranted Departures Have Been Reduced
USSC
Interviews (1)
Judges
Prosecutors
Federal Defenders
Private Attorney
Probation Officer

50%
76%
41%
32%
59%

USSC
GAO
Mail
InterSurvey (2) views (3)
32%
51%
11%
19%
52%

20%
83%
37%
37%
50%

Sources: (1) U.S. Sentencing Commission 1991a, table
27; (2) U.S. Sentencing Commission 1991a, table 28;
(3) GAO 1992, table 3.

Federal Sentencing Reporter Vol. 5, No. 3, November / December 1992

147

TONRY
Table 1 demonstrates strikingly consistent
interview and survey results from both the Commission and GAO research. Only prosecutors consistently report a belief that disparities have significantly declined under the guidelines; heavy majorities of judges and defense lawyers believe otherwise
and probation officers appear about evenly split.
Third, on the basis of its quantitative analyses, the
Commission reported statistically significant findings
of reductions in sentencing disparities in "time
expected to be served" for three of the eight narrowly
defined offenses that the Commission examined.
Because of data limitations, the Commission
confined its empirical analyses of disparity reduction
to 4 categories of robbery (with no or moderate
criminal history; with and without a weapon), two
categories of embezzlement ($10,000 to $20,000;
$20,000 to $40,000), heroin trafficking (100-400
grams), and cocaine trafficking (500-2000 grams).
Sample sizes were tiny (the pre-guidelines samples
were 17, 13, 25, 18, 27, 36, 40, and 44 cases; the postguidelines samples were 80, 38, 57, 24, 56, 71, 72, and
81 cases). Sentences from downward departures for
"substantial assistance to the government" were excluded from the analysis. For each of the eight offenses examined, sentences "pre" and "post" guidelines (both sentences announced and sentences
"expected to be served") were characterized in terms
of means, medians, and the range in months within
which the middle 80 percent of cases fell. The breadth
of the ranges of the middle 80 percent of sentences
expected to be served declined for all eight offenses,
though for 5 of those offenses the decline was not
statistically significant. In non-jargon, the "not statistically significant" caveat means that the apparent
reduction in disparity in five of the eight offenses
studied could easily have resulted from random
chance and have nothing to do with the guidelines.
There are, unhappily, five reasons why even these
modest findings are suspect. The first two are the
inherent data limitations mentioned earlier and the
tiny sample sizes. The third is that the Commission
ignored a major source of disparity when it excluded
"substantial assistance" departures from its disparity
analysis. The Commission's own process evaluation
and several other studies20 suggest that "substantial
assistance" motions are commonly used to permit
judges to impose sentences less severe than guideline
sentences that the judge and the prosecutor consider
unduly harsh. In fiscal year 1991, of all disposed
guideline cases, 12 percent were downward departures for substantial assistance; 21 percent of drug
offense dispositions were substantial assistance
departures. 21 Since judges are completely free of the
guidelines once a substantial assistance motion is
filed, opportunity for disparity is great. Excluding
those departures from the disparity analysis inevitably understates the degree of variation in sentences,
especially for drug cases.
The fourth problem is that two of the offenses
examined, heroin and cocaine trafficking, are
offenses that have become subject to mandatory

minimum 5-year sentences since the cases in the preguidelines sample were decided. Not surprisingly,
the Commission found that the median sentence
imposed for both drug crimes under the guidelines
was 60 months. Thus any apparent reduction in
disparity is likelier to result from passage of the
mandatory minimum legislation than from implementation of the guidelines.
The fifth and most important problem, however,
is conceptual. "Unwarranted disparity" is not
defined in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and
the Commission selected a self-serving definition
that inevitably exaggerates disparity reduction.
Most research on sentencing disparities uses multivariate analyses and mathematical models to
describe sentencing patterns before and after a policy
or law change. Observed differences, assuming they
are statistically significant, are then attributed to the
change. The Commission, instead, defined unwarranted disparities solely in terms of its own guidelines offense and criminal history characteristics.
The Commission's definition of "unwarranted
disparity" is doubly misleading. First, because
federal law and guidelines now set very precise
standards for sentences in relation to offenses and
criminal history, and the previous law had only
maximum authorized sanctions and a few mandatory minimums, it would be astonishing if the new
guidelines had no effect on sentencing patterns.
There were previously no targets to shoot at and
now there are. Unless we assume judges completely
ignore the guidelines, sentences should on average
be closer to the targets. Second, however, the Commission's approach might completely miss increases
in disparity in relation to variables other than current
offense and criminal history characteristics. Suppose, for example, that before the guidelines took
effect employed offenders with dependent children
typically received lighter sentences because of judges'
concern for the effects of a prison sentence on
spouses, children, and household stability. The
guidelines, which forbid judges to take account of
family status, may have made the effects of employment plus dependents less consistent than before the
guidelines (because some judges continue to struggle
to find ways to avoid imprisoning employed parents
and others accept the Commission's policy), which
would make sentencing under guidelines more, not
less, disparate than sentencing under the old system.
By defining and looking for "unwarranted disparities" as it did, the Commission took an impoverished look at disparity that was likely to produce a
finding that disparities declined.
These methodological, measurement, and
conceptual problems increased the odds that the
Commission would find that unwarranted disparities have declined. That statistically significant
findings of reduced disparities were achieved for
only three of eight selected crimes powerfully
suggests, overall, that disparities have not declined
or, as GAO more cautiously concluded, that decline
cannot be demonstrated.
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IV. Have the Guidelines Shifted Power to the
Prosecutor?
There is no serious question that the guidelines
have strengthened the prosecutor's power to dictate
or influence sentencing. Both Commission critics
such as the Federal Courts Study Committee and
Judge Heaney, and Commission apologists like
Commissioner Ilene Nagel and Professor Stephen
Schulhofer, 22 have argued that the guidelines create
new opportunities for prosecutors to influence
sentences through their charging, bargaining,
dismissal, and 5K1 motion decisions. The Federal
Courts Study Committee reported: "We have been
told that the rigidity of the guidelines is causing a
massive, though unintended, transfer of discretion
from the court to the prosecutor." 23 Judge Heaney:
"The roles of the prosecutor and the probation
officer in the sentencing process have been enhanced
and that of the district judge diminished." 24 The
only disagreement seems to be over the degree to
which prosecutorial powers have been increased.
The Commission's evaluation, based on the 12
site visits, described prosecutorial practices that vary
widely from court to court, and concluded from
interviews that prosecutorial decisions affected the
sentence that was or could have been imposed in at
least 17 percent of cases. This is acknowledged to be
an underestimate because it does not take account of
pre-indictment negotiations or of superseding
indictments or informations.2 A more recent article
26
by Commissioner Nagel and Professor Schulhofer
raises that estimate to 20-35 percent of cases. All of
these estimates are on the low side because they
depend on prosecutors signalling in some way that
they have purposely manipulated the guidelines. No
doubt some prosecutors, rather than openly admit
evasion of the guidelines and wilful noncompliance
with Department of Justice guidelines, will shelter
behind legitimate rationales for sentence-affecting
discretionary decisions (sufficiency of evidence,
concerns for workload and optimal use of office
resources, claims that a defendant has provided
"substantial assistance") to circumvent guideline
sentences that appear unwarrantedly severe or
otherwise inappropriate.
Thus on this issue, as on all the others noted, both
the Commission's self-evaluation and the GAO
report confirm the contentions of Commission critics.
V. What Are We to Conclude?
My earlier mention of Sherlock Holmes's dog
was an effort to emphasize that the Commission's
self-evaluation does not address two crucial issuesoverall judgments as to whether the guidelines have
improved federal sentencing and their effects on
court costs and delay-and reaches no credible
overall conclusion about sentencing disparities.
And yet, despite those silences, the Commission
invokes the self-evaluation to make exaggerated
claims about the guidelines' success. Commission
chairman Wilkins, for example, in his pre- publication comments on the GAO report, claims that the

selfevaluation and GAO conclude that "disparity has
decreased under the guidelines" 27 and urges that
GAO retitle its report "Sentencing Guidelines:
Disparity Reduced, But Some Questions Remain,"28
even though both the Commission and GAO reports
took pains to insist that, partly for methodological
reasons, as GAO put it, "neither we nor the Commission can definitively answer the central question
posed by Congress regarding how effective the
sentencing guidelines have been in reducing sentencing disparity." 29 Similarly, Commissioner A. David
Mazzone, writing in the September 28, 1992 issue of
the National Law journal, claims that the GAO and
Commission studies "firmly support a conclusion
that, while there is much to be done, the new system
is better than the old," even though the Commission
did not solicit opinions on that global question and
GAO reported that "most judges, defense attorneys,
and probation officers on balance did not believe the
guidelines were an improvement over the prior
system."
Finally, despite the lack of GAO confirmation of
its findings, the Commission, perhaps pollyannaishly, concluded that the "system is making definite,
substantial progress toward successful guideline
implementation ... on the whole, the guidelines
system is operating relatively smoothly. " 3 An
objective observer would, to the contrary, agree with
district judge Jose Cabranes, in the July 27 issue of
the National Law Journal, that the sentencing guidelines experiment is a failure, "a fact well known and
fully understood ... by virtually everyone associated
with the federal justice system."
Reasonable people will differ in their explanations
of why the U.S. Sentencing Commission was unable
successfully to develop and implement sentencing
guidelines when a number of states have succeeded.
Finger-pointing, however, can serve no purpose.
What is important now is to admit the failure and
begin the effort to create a federal sentencing system
that is efficient, fair, and even-handed.
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